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Individual success in group-structured populations has two components. First, an individual gains
by outcompeting its neighbors for local resources. Second, an individual’s share of group success
must be weighted by the total productivity of the group. The essence of sociality arises from the
tension between selfish gains against neighbors and the associated loss that selfishness imposes by
degrading the efficiency of the group. Without some force to modulate selfishness, the natural
tendencies of self interest typically degrade group performance to the detriment of all. This is the
tragedy of the commons. Kin selection provides the most widely discussed way in which the tragedy
is overcome in biology. Kin selection arises from behavioral associations within groups caused either
by genetical kinship or by other processes that correlate the behaviors of group members. Here,
I emphasize demography as a second factor that may also modulate the tragedy of the commons
and favor cooperative integration of groups. Each act of selfishness or cooperation in a group
often influences group survival and fecundity over many subsequent generations. For example, a
cooperative act early in the growth cycle of a colony may enhance the future size and survival of
the colony. This time-dependent benefit can greatly increase the degree of cooperation favored by
natural selection, providing another way in which to overcome the tragedy of the commons and
enhance the integration of group behavior. I conclude that analyses of sociality must account for
both the behavioral associations of kin selection theory and the demographic consequences of life
history theorya
In a single battle the Peloponnesians and
their allies may be able to defy all Hellas,
but they are incapacitated from carrying on
a war. . . by the want of the single council-
chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous ac-
tion. . . Slow in assembling, they devote a very
small fraction of the time to the considera-
tion of any public object, most of it to the
prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile
each fancies that no harm will come of his
neglect, that it is the business of somebody
else to look after this or that for him; and so,
by the same notion being entertained by all
separately, the common cause imperceptibly
decays [1, pp. 93–94].
INTRODUCTION
Thucydides describes how self interest works against
group benefit and ultimately degrades individual success.
Hardin [2] coined the phrase “the tragedy of the com-
mons” for this process. The tragedy shapes all patterns
of life because of the fundamental self interest promoted
by natural selection.
In evolutionary studies, the central role of the tragedy
grew with increasing understanding of kin selection,
group selection, selfish genes, and levels of selection [3].
Hamilton [4, 5] had the idea from the start, and the prob-
lem informed much of his great work. The vigorous de-
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bates in the 1980s over sex ratios and levels of selection
turned on how population structure and genetic relat-
edness modulated the tragedy [6–10]. Later, Maynard
Smith and Sza´thmary began to emphasize that the ma-
jor transitions in the history of life followed solution of
the tragedy at various levels of organization: the integra-
tion of genomes, cells, multicell organisms, and colonies
into functional units with relatively little internal conflict
[11–14].
Leigh [15] directly connected the puzzles of group in-
tegrity to Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” slogan,
but, at the time, that framing did not catch on [3]. In
addition, none of the work had laid out the tragedy in a
simple and explicit evolutionary model and connected the
ideas to the broader subject raised by Hardin. I picked
up on this opportunity and made several explicit evo-
lutionary models of the tragedy that directly linked the
concepts to Hardin’s memorable phrase [16–19].
I showed the interaction of two key ideas. First, behav-
ioral association through genetic relatedness provides the
simplest solution to the tragedy. In the tradeoff between
individual success and group efficiency, natural selection
favors more closely related individuals to act more like
a unit. The group achieves improved efficiency in pro-
portion to the relatedness between group members. My
model showed this well-known relatedness effect of group
population structure in the simplest way, facilitating ap-
plication to a wide variety of problems.
The second idea followed the work of Leigh [15],
Alexander [20, 21], and Buss [22], in which they empha-
sized mechanisms that prevented or repressed internal
competition within groups. If individuals cannot com-
pete within groups, they can only increase their own
personal success by raising the efficiency of the group in
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2which they live [23]. The evolutionary problem concerns
how such internal repressive mechanisms can be favored
by natural selection. Any individual that pays a cost to-
ward such a mechanism would be at a competitive disad-
vantage against neighbors that refrain from contributing
to the group-beneficial process. I showed, in an explicit
evolutionary model, how such repressive mechanisms can
arise, and how the dynamics depend on an interesting in-
teraction with kin selection [17].
Since the mid-1990s, the tragedy of the commons has
become the central concept in much work on sociality
[3, 24]. On the theoretical side, the rapid growth of the
slogan and the approach derives from greatly increased
interest in the evolutionary analysis of cooperation. On
the empirical side, more has become known about vari-
ous levels of social integration and conflict in insects and
other animals.
Several new observations have also been made on social
aspects of microbes [25–27]. For example, many microbes
secrete molecules to alter the environment in beneficial
ways. The secretions are often costly to the secretors
with regard to growth rate. Neighbors that do not se-
crete gain the same benefit as the secretors, but do not
pay the cost. This creates a tragedy of the commons: all
microbes in a group do better by secretions that modify
the environment, but those cheaters that do not secrete
can outcompete their cooperative, secreting neighbors.
As the cheaters rise in frequency, group efficiency de-
clines.
Recent studies of the tragedy focus almost entirely on
the role of behavioral associations and the kin selection
coefficient of relatedness in determining the level of co-
operation and group efficiency. Here, I argue that demo-
graphic factors may often be as important as relatedness
in shaping the level of cooperative behavior and the de-
gree to which groups succumb to the tragedy.
THE TRAGEDY AND BEHAVIORAL
ASSOCIATIONS
I first establish the basic model of the tragedy with
respect to behavioral associations expressed by the coef-
ficient of relatedness of kin selection theory. I then extend
the model to analyze the consequences of demography.
The role of relatedness can be understood simply by
Hamilton’s 1964 rule, in which a cooperative behavior
increases if rb − c > 0. In group-structured models,
the term r measures the behavioral association between
group members [28]. For models of the tragedy of the
commons, typically all members of a local group are both
actors and recipients with regard to cooperative behav-
ior. A pathogen may, for example, secrete a molecule
that interferes with host immunity. All members of the
local pathogen population, including the secretor itself,
gain by the secretion. Thus we may think of the group
as the recipient and of each individual as a potential se-
cretor and thus as an actor.
The terms b and c represent the benefit to the recip-
ients and the cost to the actor. If we know r, b, and
c, then we can easily evaluate how a cooperative trait
evolves. However, the ways in which b and c arise in
relation to behaviors can be complex.
Suppose, for example, that we follow a pathogen pop-
ulation within a host over the course of an infection. Let
time t0 be the initiation of the infection. At time t1,
individuals may secrete a quantity 1 − x of a molecule
that benefits all members of the group. Suppose that the
competitiveness of an individual that secretes 1− x is in
proportion to x; for example, a secretion of 1 − x = 0
allows the individual to achieve the maximum relative
competitiveness of x = 1. We can think of x as the level
of competitiveness against neighbors in the group and,
equivalently, we can think of 1 − x as the level of coop-
eration. Define the average level of cooperation in the
local group at time t1 to be 1− y; thus, the average level
of competitiveness is y.
Assume that the cooperation level at time t1 has only
the following two immediate consequences. First, relative
competitiveness of an individual compared with neigh-
bors is in proportion to x/y. This fraction is proportional
to the relative share of group productivity obtained by
an individual that cooperates at level 1 − x in a group
with average cooperation level 1−y. Second, cooperation
enhances group productivity. Thus, group productivity
is in proportion to the average group cooperation, 1− y.
Multiplying an individual’s relative share of group pro-
ductivity, x/y, by the group productivity, 1 − y, yields
E(w|x, y), the expected fitness of an individual given x
and y [16], as
w =
x
y
(1− y), (1)
where I write w as a shortened notation for E(w|x, y).
We find the phenotype favored by natural selection as the
value of competitiveness, z∗, and the level of cooperation,
1−z∗, by using the method introduced in Frank [17] and
developed in Taylor and Frank [29]. To keep the analysis
simple and focus on essential processes, I assume here
that individuals are haploid.
We obtain the favored phenotype by maximizing w
with respect to x, and evaluating at a candidate equi-
librium x = y = z∗. In particular, we solve
dw
dx
=
∂w
∂x
+
∂w
∂y
dy
dx
(2)
= −c+ br = 0.
From Hamilton’s rule, the equilibrium occurs when rb−
c = 0. Hamilton’s rule was known since 1964, but was
not used successfully to solve problems of sex ratios, dis-
persal, or tragedy of the commons interactions [28]. The
method here shows how to go directly from an expression
for fitness, w, to a solution, by calculating the marginal
cost as −c = ∂w/∂x, the marginal benefit as b = ∂w/∂y,
and relatedness as r = dy/dx.
3Applying this method to Eq. (1) and evaluating at x =
y = z∗ yields
dw
dx
=
∂w
∂x
+
∂w
∂y
dy
dx
=
1− z∗
z∗
− r
(
1
z∗
)
= 0.
Solving gives the level of secretion and the degree of co-
operation [16, 17] as
1− z∗ = r,
which we may also express as the ratio of cooperative to
competitive tendency, 1− z∗ : z∗, as
r : 1− r. (3)
The method expressed in Eq. (2) [29, 30] has been used
to solve many problems. Before 1996, I used variants of
this method to analyze numerous models of dispersal, sex
ratios, and social evolution [28]. Indeed, most such prob-
lems had not been, and effectively could not have been,
solved simply in general terms of behavioral associations
and relatedness without this sort of method. Since 1996,
many others have picked up the method and applied it
to a wide variety of problems in social evolution.
The method of Eq. (2) provides a simple way to parse
the components of Hamilton’s rule. This method is one
contribution of Taylor and Frank [29] and, as I men-
tioned, this method has been widely used in recent years.
The second contribution of Taylor and Frank [29] is a
formal method to combine demographic analyses of life
history with the social aspects that derive from the kin
selection coefficient of relatedness. That approach arose
from combining Taylor’s 1990 formal methods for life his-
tory analysis with the simple parsing of components of
fitness achieved by an extension of Eq. (2).
The combination of life history theory with kin selec-
tion theory provided, for the first time, a simple and di-
rect way to study the relative importance of components
of fitness with regard to social traits. In particular, the
method allowed one to understand how a social behav-
ior may simultaneously influence aspects of current and
future fecundity and survival, with those distinct fitness
components weighted by the various kinds of phenotypic
and genetic correlations between different classes of indi-
viduals that influence the selection and transmission of
social characters.
The life history components of fitness often shape so-
cial traits as strongly as do the genetic associations em-
phasized in the kin and group selection theories of so-
ciality. Much of my book on social evolution emphasized
how demography shapes life history and sociality [28].
However, in subsequent years, those demographic and
life history factors have not received nearly the attention
as the kin and group selection factors of sociality.
The tragedy of the commons model has become the
archetypical problem of social evolution. To show the
ways in which demography and life history contribute to
sociality, I extend the typical expression of the tragedy
model given above to include explicitly the fecundity and
viability components of fitness.
THE TRAGEDY IN A DEMOGRAPHIC
CONTEXT
To illustrate the relative contributions of demography
and relatedness to cooperation, I extend the tragedy of
the commons model. I use a variant of a sex ratio model
in Frank [28, 32, pp. 238–242]. Several other sex ratios
models addressed related problems [6, 9, 33–37]. See also
various other formulations of demography and coopera-
tion [38–44].
Cycle fitness
We follow a group or colony through time. For sim-
plicity, I focus on a series of discrete generations indexed
by j = 0, . . . ,∞. Consider, in each generation, the com-
petitiveness of an individual, xj , or, equivalently, the in-
dividual’s level of cooperation, 1− xj . Similarly, we use
group competitiveness, yj , or group cooperation, 1− yj .
Individuals may have different behaviors in each genera-
tion, j, altering their competitiveness, xj . We seek the
set of behaviors favored by natural selection, z∗ = {z∗j }
for j = 0, . . . ,∞.
To start, we need an expression for how an individual’s
fitness depends on its own behavior, x = {xj}, and the
average behavior of the individual’s group, y = {yj}.
The fitness consequences of individual and colony be-
havior, xj and yj , can be expressed by three factors mea-
sured over a full demographic cycle [28, 45, p. 239]. First,
the individual and colony behaviors in generation j deter-
mine the fraction, f , of future progeny that descend from
a generation j individual. Second, future progeny must
be discounted by the population growth rate, λ. Finally,
the number of future progeny depends on the fecundity
of the colony, F , at each age multiplied by the proba-
bility that the colony will survive to that age, S. These
factors combine to give the total reproductive value of
future progeny that emigrate to form new generation 0
colonies
wj = f(xj , yj)
∞∑
k=j
λ−kS(yk)F (yk). (4)
The cycle fitness of an individual in generation j, with
competitiveness xj and colony competitiveness yj , is
given by wj . The function f is the fraction of future
colony offspring that descend from an individual with
competitiveness xj . The survivorship of the colony to
produce generation k is S(yk), where yk is the vector of
all colony competitiveness values for j = 0, . . . , k. The
fecundity of the colony in generation k is F (yk).
4General solution
If the competitiveness produced in each generation
is an independent trait, then the direction of selection
on competitiveness in the jth generation in this haploid
model is given by dwj/dxj . Because there are three func-
tions, f , S, and F , the total derivative has three parts
by application of the chain rule
dwj
dxj
= P1 + P2 + P3. (5)
We search for a candidate solution by solving
dwj
dxj
= 0 (6)
at x = y = z∗.
Before expressing the individual components of
Eq. (5), it is useful to have some shortened notation,
in which all derivatives are evaluated at x = y = z∗
K =
∞∑
k=j
λ−kS(z∗k)F (z
∗
k)
r = dyj/dxj
f∗ = f(z∗j , z
∗
j )
fxj =
∂f(xj , yj)
∂xj
fyj =
∂f(xj , yj)
∂yj
Fyj =
∂F (yk)
F (z∗k)∂yj
=
∂ log [F (yk)]
∂yj
Syj =
∂S(yk)
S(z∗k)∂yj
=
∂ log [S(yk)]
∂yj
.
Differentiating f , S, and F in turn, in each case holding
the other two terms constant, yields
P1 =
(
fxj + rfyj
)
K
P2 = rf
∗
∞∑
k=j
λ−kS(z∗k)F (z
∗
k)Syj
P3 = rf
∗
∞∑
k=j
λ−kS(z∗k)F (z
∗
k)Fyj .
If Syj and Fyj are independent of the index k, as in the
specific model below, then we can write these expressions
in simplified form
P1 =
(
fxj + rfyj
)
K
P2 = rf
∗KSyj
P3 = rf
∗KFyj .
We obtain the behavior in the jth generation favored
by natural selection, z∗j , by solving Eq. (6). Using the
simplified forms for the P terms and substituting into
Eq. (6) yields the expression
fxj + rfyj + rf
∗ (Syj + Fyj) = 0. (7)
With respect to Hamilton’s rule, rb − c = 0 at equi-
librium. Here, we have −c = fxj and b = fyj +
f∗
(
Syj + Fyj
)
. The survival and fecundity components,
S and F , show explicitly the marginal effects of altruism
associated with these two components of fitness. In some
cases, a current behavior may cause marginal changes in
survival or fecundity in the future. This formulation ac-
counts for those future effects.
Simple tragedy model
I extend the approach to the simple tragedy model in
Eq. (1) to a multigenerational model in which we need
to track survival and fecundity. To begin, let individ-
ual competitiveness against neighbors lead to a relative
success in the jth generation of
f(xj , yj) =
xj
yj
.
Then f∗ = 1 and
fxj + rfyj =
1− r
z∗j
.
We now need to make some assumptions about how
competitive and cooperative behaviors influence survival
and fecundity. In this particular model, I assume that the
colony grows from generations k = 0, . . . , g − 1 without
sending out any migrants, and then maintains a stable
size and sends out migrants in proportion to F (z∗k) in the
following generations k = g, . . . In this example, colony
fecundity increases linearly with colony size; that is, the
number of neighboring individuals neither increases nor
decreases the fecundity per individual. Thus colony fe-
cundity is zero through the first g−1 generations. Colony
fecundity in the following generations, k ≥ g, is propor-
tional to
F (z∗k) =
[
N
g−1∏
i=0
n(1− z∗i )
]
n(1− z∗k),
where N is the number of founding individuals in gener-
ation 0, and n(1 − z∗i ) is the number of offspring in the
ith generation of a normal colony. The term in square
brackets is the size that the colony has achieved during
the growth phase, and 1− z∗k is the number of individu-
als produced for dispersal during the reproductive phase.
When the level of cooperation deviates from normal only
in generation j, then
F (yk) = F (z
∗
k)
1− yj
1− z∗j
,
5and the partial derivative of the logarithm of F with
respect to the deviant group level of cooperation is
Fyj = −
1
1− z∗j
.
Colony survival is also divided into two periods. For
colony growth, during generation k < g, survival in each
generation is a function of the current colony size relative
to the size of a mature, normal colony
σ(yk) = δ
[∏k−1
i=0 n(1− yi)∏g−1
i=0 n(1− z∗i )
]θ
,
with σ(yk) = δ for k ≥ g. Survival through generation k
is therefore
S(yk) =
k∏
i=0
σ(yi).
When the level of cooperation deviates from normal only
in generation j < g − 1, then survival in each generation
with k > j is
σ(yk) = σ(z
∗
k)
[
1− yj
1− z∗j
]θ
,
and survival in generations k ≤ j is σ(z∗k). Cumulative
survival over generations for k > g − 1 is
S(yk) = S(z
∗
k)
[
1− yj
1− z∗j
]θ(g−1−j)
.
The partial derivative of the logarithm of S with respect
to deviant group cooperation is
Syj = −
γj
1− z∗j
,
where
γj =
{
θ(g − 1− j) j < g − 1
0 j ≥ g − 1. (8)
We use these various expressions in Eq. (7) to solve for
the equilibrium level of cooperation in each generation j
as
1− z∗j = r + αj , (9)
where
αj =
rγj(1− r)
1 + rγj
(10)
is the extra amount of cooperation favored by the con-
tribution of cooperation to colony survival. We may also
express the ratio of cooperative to competitive tendency,
1− z∗j : z∗j , as
r(1 + γj) : 1− r, (11)
which, in comparison with Eq. (3), shows the simple con-
sequence of the life history component summarized by γj .
DISCUSSION
The tragedy of the commons is the primary concept by
which we understand competition and cooperation within
groups. Recent literature has emphasized the role of kin
selection in modulating the level of cooperation favored
by natural selection.
I emphasized here that, in determining the level of co-
operation within groups, the consequences of behavior
for group survival and fecundity are just as important as
the behavioral associations of kin selection. To under-
stand the tragedy, or any sort of sociality in groups and
colonies, one must study natural selection within the full
life history context of how behaviors influence survival,
fecundity, and dispersal to form new colonies.
Summary of the models
The first model, in Eq. (1), isolated the role of kin
selection to show clearly the direct effect of this impor-
tant component. In that model, competition against
neighbors determines the share of group productivity ac-
quired by an individual. The total group productivity
declines in proportion to the average level of competi-
tiveness of group members—or, equivalently, group pro-
ductivity rises in proportion to the average level of coop-
eration in the group. The level of cooperation favored by
natural selection is
1− z∗ = r,
where r is the behavioral association between group
members, usually taken as the coefficient of relatedness
from kin selection theory.
The variance between groups is in proportion to 1− r,
so we see directly the formal equivalence of kin selection
theory based on associations within groups, r, and group
selection theory, based on variance between groups, 1− r
[9]. Some authors object to the word “kin” in kin selec-
tion theory. But, in the formal theory, it has long been
known that the r of kin selection describes the associa-
tion between individuals in behavior or in genetic effects
and not the pedigree relations usually associated with
the word “kin” [28, 46, 47]. Instead of “kin selection the-
ory” we could say “behavioral association theory”, but
the former has clear precedence.
The second model, in Eq. (4), takes account of the fact
that behaviors in the present have future consequences
for survival and reproduction. If a young colony rarely
reproduces when small, then a major effect of competi-
tion and cooperation in small colonies arises through the
future consequences of those behaviors on colony survival
and reproduction. To illustrate these life history con-
sequences, I made some simple assumptions about how
behaviors affect survival and reproduction.
In particular, I assumed that colonies first grow to a
fixed size over a fixed period of time before reproduc-
ing [48]. Then, after the mature colony size has been
6(a) (b)
FIG. 1. Level of cooperation from relatedness, r, and colony survival benefits, γj , in the jth generation of colony development.
(a) The total level of cooperation combining the direct contribution of relatedness, r, plus the synergism between relatedness
and survival given by αj in Eq. (9). (b) The part of the total cooperation level ascribed to αj , the synergism between relatedness
and survival. The term αj is defined in Eq. (10).
reached, I assumed that colonies remain constant in size
and export all extra growth as dispersers to found new
colonies. Throughout the colony lifetime, colony survival
increases with colony size by setting the probability of
survival in each generation in proportion to colony size
raised to the exponent θ.
Within each generation of the colony, I assumed that
an individual’s share of the total colony in the next gen-
eration is in proportion to the individual’s competitive-
ness. I also assumed that colony growth declines in pro-
portion to the average level of competitiveness of group
members—or, equivalently, group productivity rises in
proportion to the average level of cooperation in the
group.
With these assumptions, I derived the level of cooper-
ation in the jth generation of colony growth in Eq. (9),
which I repeat here
1− z∗j = r + αj ,
where r is the behavioral association between individuals
within groups, and αj is the excess level of cooperation
favored by the synergism between the behavioral associ-
ation and the total future colony survival benefit added
by an increased level of cooperation. Eq. (10) gives the
expression for αj , and Eq. (8) gives the expression for
the future colony survival benefit from increased cooper-
ation, γj .
Figure 1a shows the level of cooperation favored for
each level of behavioral association, r, and colony sur-
vival benefit, γj . The common interpretation of the
tragedy solely in terms of relatedness, r, is given by
γj = αj = 0. Figure 1b shows the extra amount of
cooperation from the synergism between the behavioral
association, r, and the life history component of survival
benefits, γj . The plots show that, at lower levels of relat-
edness, r, high levels of cooperation are still favored when
the future survival benefits of cooperation are strong.
Thus, weakly related groups may still be highly coop-
erative and integrated when their mutual survival over
time depends on strongly cooperative contributions from
group members.
In this particular model, I have allowed individuals
to adjust their level of cooperation over time. Early in
the colony life cycle, cooperation strongly enhances fu-
ture survival because colony survival depends on colony
growth. Later in the colony life cycle, the colony will
have achieved its maximal size, and cooperation no longer
enhances future survival. Consequently, cooperation is
more strongly favored early in the colony life cycle, with
the measure of survival benefits for cooperation, γj , start-
ing high when generation j is low and declining to zero
as generation j increases.
Alternative assumptions
The particular patterns of cooperation depend on the
specific assumptions about how cooperation influences
survival and fecundity. For example, behavior could be
fixed and unchanging with changes in colony size. Then,
as shown in Frank [32] for a sex ratio model, the level of
cooperation will be some sort of averaging over the coop-
erative intensity favored in each separate generation. For
example, in the specific model above, higher cooperation
is favored early in the colony life cycle and lower cooper-
ation is favored later in the cycle. With fixed behavior,
the level of cooperation would be an averaging over the
various levels favored over the colony life cycle.
Alternatively, we might assume that cooperation does
not affect colony survival in the early generations, when
the colony is small, but cooperation can have a very
strong effect on survival once the colony has achieved
a certain size. Such size dependence may arise because
cooperation is not effective at small colony size. For ex-
ample, if cooperation occurs in a bacterial population
through secretion of a diffusible molecule, then a small
population may not be able to make enough of the dif-
fusible molecule to alter the environment in a significant
7way. As the colony grows, it eventually achieves suffi-
cient density for the cooperative effects of the diffusible
molecule to be significant. In this case, cooperation likely
rises as the colony grows, with the level of cooperation
depending on how changes in behavior alter marginal sur-
vival and fecundity.
The analyses here all depend on the assumption that
natural selection favors those behaviors that contribute
most to the future of the aggregate population. There
can, however, be strong components of natural selection
operating on various timescales. For example, mutants
can arise within groups and spread rapidly, even though
those mutants, by degrading the group in which they live,
contribute little to the future population. This tension
between short and long timescales can be particularly
strong in large, multigenerational microbial colonies, in
which there is much opportunity for mutation and se-
lection within groups [49]. These timescale issues are
very important, but distinctive with regard to methods
of analysis and consequences. I take up these issues in a
later paper.
In summary, analyses of sociality must account for
both the behavioral associations of kin selection theory
and the demographic consequences of life history theory.
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